

SCOTTSDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Flock Camera Usage

How the technology works, what governs its use, and considerations moving forward

Regular Agenda Item 16 | October 6, 2026

Joe LeDuc, Chief of Police





OUR MISSION

“As part of our community, we are united in purpose and selfless in action to ensure a safe Scottsdale.”

Everything tonight starts here: protecting every person who lives in, works in, and visits Scottsdale.

FEBRUARY 7-18, 2024

A woman is killed in a New York City hotel. Days later, the man accused of her murder is in the Valley.

- February 17: A woman is stabbed during an attempted carjacking in Phoenix.
- February 18: A woman is stabbed multiple times in Surprise. The suspect flees in a stolen car.
- Scottsdale Flock camera reads the stolen car's plate as it enters the city.
- Real Time Crime Center Technicians follow the plate reads to a parking garage at Scottsdale Fashion Square.
- Officers set a perimeter and find the car on the third level.
- The suspect tries to drive away. Officers stop him and take him into custody without incident.
- After the arrest, Arizona investigators learn he is wanted in the New York homicide.

A shopping mall. A violent suspect. No one else hurt.

That is what this conversation is about.

Sources: [Manhattan District Attorney \(Apr. 5, 2024\)](#) | [Maricopa County Attorney](#) | [Arizona Republic \(Dec. 11, 2025\)](#) | Charges are allegations only.

AGENDA

What we will cover tonight

- 1 **Public safety, privacy, and community trust**
Why we're here, and the standard we hold ourselves to
- 2 **Technology overview**
What ALPR is, what it is not, what it does, and why
- 3 **How it works**
Hot lists, who has access, how we search, and what an alert means
- 4 **One Community – Shared Trust**
Policy FLD 1137, auditing, and how we create accountability around technology
- 5 **Results**
Documented outcomes
- 6 **Governance and suggestions for moving forward**
Independent audit, technology ordinance, transparency



SECTION 1

Public Safety, Privacy, and Community Trust

These are not opposing goals. We can have both — and we should be held to both.

Policy and accountability before implementation — Built on policy and driven by accountability.

PURPOSE

Why we're here tonight

What brought us here

- Council directed a public discussion on the continued use of ALPR in Scottsdale.
- Incidents at other Arizona agencies have raised real questions about privacy, oversight, and misuse.
- Much of what has circulated about ALPR specifically is missing context, inaccurate, or both.

What staff is seeking tonight

- A full discussion of how the program works and how it is governed.
- Review of accountability measures.
- Support to maintain a critical tool while working together to build on existing safeguards.

Respecting individual rights is not a constraint on this work — it is the basis of it.

SCOTTSDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT



THE STANDARD WE HOLD OURSELVES TO

Four commitments

1

Lawful

Use requires a legitimate law enforcement/public safety purpose or an active criminal investigation.

SPD operates within the Fourth Amendment and constitutional protections of privacy.

2

Accountable

Every search is tied to an individual user, documented, and auditable. No anonymous queries.

3

Effective

The program helps return stolen vehicles, locate missing and vulnerable people, and arrest violent offenders.

Give detectives leads they wouldn't otherwise have.

4

Transparent

The rules under which we operate should be known and understandable to the people we serve.

These four commitments are the test. If the program cannot meet all four, it should change.



SECTION 2

Technology Overview

What an ALPR is, what it records, and what it does not do.

TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW

What the technology does — and does not do

An ALPR camera records a point-in-time observation when a vehicle passes it on a public roadway: the publicly displayed license plate, the date and time, the camera location, and limited vehicle characteristics such as color or body style.

WHAT IT DOES

- Records license plates visible on public roadways
- Compares plates against hot lists
- Alerts personnel when a vehicle connected to a specific case is detected
- Supports investigations tied to a documented case, call for service, or Attempt to Locate

WHAT IT DOES NOT DO

- Use facial recognition, or identify drivers or occupants
- Attach to a vehicle or transmit continuous location the way a GPS tracker does
- Permits searches without a case number, call for service, or a documented law enforcement purpose
- Operate without user identification, every search is logged to a person
- Retain records indefinitely to establish “patterns”



TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW

Scottsdale's program at a glance

85

Fixed ALPR cameras citywide

Fixed cameras at pre-identified public roadway locations.

185

days retention (plate data)

Unless the data becomes part of an investigation or is subject to lawful preservation.

\$280,500

annual program cost

Set against the cost of investigating and prosecuting a single violent crime.

Program history

Scottsdale has used ALPR technology since 2008, nearly two decades. The current Flock Safety program began in February 2023, and the contract runs through June 20, 2028. The contract was administratively approved through City Purchasing, consistent with the City's procurement authority.

Sources: [ALPR Policy FLD 1137](#) | [AZ retention schedule GS-1031 \(series 53161, 20827\)](#) | [SPD Transparency](#)



Additional safeguards built into Flock

Scottsdale owns the data

Plate images, vehicle characteristics, locations, alerts, and audit logs belong to the City. Flock may use them only to provide the service, and the 2026 contract amendment prohibits Flock from selling or disseminating them.

No bulk access for other agencies

Another agency sees a Scottsdale record only when it runs a specific search with a stated reason and a matching vehicle passed a Scottsdale camera. Records cannot be passed on to a third agency, and SPD can limit sharing by agency, permission, geography, and offense type.

Federal access requires SPD approval

Federal sharing is off by default and requires SPD to opt in and approve each request. Flock does not release data on informal requests, and it redirects subpoenas and warrants to the City with notice.

Vendor access is logged

Flock staff may access Scottsdale data only for support and maintenance, and their actions appear in SPD's own event log. Data is encrypted, and criminal justice data is stored in a government cloud environment.

SECTION 3

How It Works

From a hot list entry to an alert — and who can see what.



HOW IT WORKS

Terminology and hot lists

ALPR

Automated License Plate Recognition. Also called a license plate reader.

Read

A single observation of a plate at a camera, with date, time, and location.

Alert

A possible match between a read and a plate on a law enforcement hot list.

Hot list

A list of plates tied to NCIC, ACIC, MVD, or a documented local investigation.

What lands on a hot list

LOADED AUTOMATICALLY FROM NCIC

Added when any agency enters the record into NCIC. SPD does not add these.

- Terrorist Watch List/Gang Members
- Stolen vehicles and stolen license plates
- Wanted persons and active warrants
- Missing and endangered persons
- AMBER, SAFE, and BLUE Alerts
- Protection orders
- Violent persons and violent felony suspects
- Sex Offenders

ENTERED BY AUTHORIZED SPD USERS

- Vehicles tied to a documented local investigation
- Only detectives and trained hot list users, and only with a case number.

HOW IT WORKS

How a plate gets on a hot list

FROM STATE AND NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS

Loaded automatically

- Terrorist Watch List/Gang Members
- Stolen vehicles and stolen plates
- Wanted persons and active warrants
- Missing and endangered persons
- AMBER, SAFE, and BLUE Alerts
- Protection orders
- Sex Offenders

Drawn from NCIC and ACIC — the same records an officer checks on a traffic stop.

ENTERED BY SCOTTSDALE PERSONNEL

Only with a documented case

Every entry must include:

- **Plate and state**
- **DR or call-for-service number**
- **Type of investigation**
- **Who requested it**
- **Reason for the entry**

Removed when the investigative need ends. A random sample is checked every quarter.

No case, no entry. Entering plates to track people at protests or free-speech events is prohibited by policy.



HOW IT WORKS

Who can see Scottsdale's data

Arizona

law enforcement only

Only Arizona police and sheriff's agencies can access Scottsdale's Flock data.

Inside SPD

Trained, authorized users with individual credentials. Access is removed within one business day when no longer needed, and the user list is reviewed every year.

Outside agencies Arizona law enforcement agencies only.

Never

Scottsdale's ALPR data is not sold and is not shared with private companies.



HOW IT WORKS

Every search starts with a case number

The screenshot shows a search interface with the following sections:

- Investigative Purpose**: Includes "Offense Type*" (a dropdown menu) and "Case Number*" (a text input field with a red asterisk indicating it is required). Below these is a "Reason" field.
- Vehicle Details**: Includes "License Plate" (a text input field), "Plate State" (a dropdown menu), "Vehicle Signature" (a text input field), and "Enter body, make, color, etc." (a text input field).
- Location & Time**: Includes "Location" (a dropdown menu), "All Network(s) Selected" (a checkbox), "Start" and "End" date/time pickers, and a "Map & Devices" button.

At the bottom, there is a "Reset" button, a "0" indicator, and a "Run Search" button.


- 1 Offense type — required**
The system will not run a search until it is filled in.
- 2 Case number — required**
Every search ties to a documented case or call for service.
- 3 Reason — required**
SPD made the reason field required by policy, not just recommended.
- 4 Logged to a named user — required**
Every search is recorded under the person who ran it and is subject to audit.

No case number, no call for service number, no search.



HOW IT WORKS

What an officer sees




Stolen plate alert. Plates redacted.

- 1 License plate image**
A photograph of the plate as captured on a public roadway.

- 2 Vehicle image**
Color, body style, and distinguishing features.

- 3 Date, time, location**
Where and when the vehicle passed a specific camera.




Stolen vehicle alert (NCIC). Plate redacted.

No personally identifying information is displayed. No name. No address. No driver or occupant identification. No facial recognition.



HOW IT WORKS

An alert is a lead, not a reason to stop someone



No enforcement action rests on the camera. The technology narrows where to look; a person still has to establish the legal basis.



HOW IT WORKS

What an alert means — and what it doesn't

FOR THE DRIVER

- An alert alone never leads to a stop.
- Contact happens only after the alert is confirmed against the original record and an officer re-verifies the plate.
- If the record doesn't check out, there is no contact.

FOR THE DEPARTMENT

- Dispatch or the RTCC confirms the hit and broadcasts an Attempt to Locate.
- An officer independently re-verifies before taking action.
- The officer — not the camera — must establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
- The outcome is documented in the case.

Verification is the safeguard: an alert tells an officer where to look, never who to stop.



MYTH VS. FACT

Officer safety is public safety

MYTH

"You can support law enforcement and not support ALPRs."

FACT

Supporting officers means supporting the tools that keep them safe.

ALPR is a critical officer safety tool, not just an investigative one.

1

Know before the stop

Officers learn a vehicle is stolen or tied to a violent crime before they approach it, not at the driver's window.

2

Plan the contact

That warning gives officers time to call for backup and choose where and how to make the stop.

3

Calmer encounters

In a crisis call, officers know what they're walking into. That protects everyone in the car, too.

4

Fewer pursuits

Finding a stolen car, often parked, can replace a high-speed chase through a neighborhood.



SECTION 4

ONE COMMUNITY – SHARED TRUST

Policy FLD 1137, auditing, governance, and safeguards.



SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE TODAY

Policy FLD 1137: who may use it, and for what

- Use is strictly limited to criminal investigations or a justified public safety concern. Entries for personal reasons are strictly prohibited.
- Only RTCC personnel, dispatch supervisors (when RTCC is unavailable), and designated trained investigators can enter plates.
- Each entry documents the plate, state, Departmental Report or Call For Service number, type of investigation, requestor, and reason.
- Entries related to free-speech activity or protests are strictly prohibited.
- Training is required before use. Access is through individual credentials over an encrypted connection. RTCC removes access within one business day when the need ends and reviews the user list at least annually.

Policy is public

FLD 1137 is posted on the Department's public policy portal.

public.powerdms.com/SCOTT/tree/documents/906129

Dually accredited



National: Meets CALEA Standard 41.3.9 for license plate readers. Outside assessors have found SPD in compliance. Accredited since 1994.

State: Also accredited by the Arizona Law Enforcement Accreditation Program (ALEAP).

OVERSIGHT

Every anomaly creates an alert

1

Alert

Audits flag searches beyond 30 days, multiple case numbers on one plate, single-user plate searches, and external network searches.

2

Review

A Real Time Crime Center auditor with no part in the search checks it against the case and policy.

3

Report

Any anomaly that can't be matched to a justified law enforcement purpose goes to the RTCC Manager and Division Deputy Director.

4

Outside review

The Deputy Director decides on an Internal Affairs referral. RTCC cannot close its own discrepancies.

5

Consequences

Discipline up to termination, referral to AZPOST, and criminal referral where the law allows.

0

Searches found to be misuse. We have sent several for outside review and all have been determined to be within policy.



FOURTH AMENDMENT

The legal framework

Concerns about privacy deserve to be taken seriously — and so does an accurate description of the law.

NINTH CIRCUIT — CONTROLLING IN ARIZONA

United States v. Diaz-Castaneda

Running a license plate is not a Fourth Amendment search. Plates are displayed on the exterior of a vehicle in plain view and are specifically intended to convey identifying information.

FIFTH CIRCUIT — PERSUASIVE, NOT CONTROLLING

United States v. Porter (March 2026)

Addressed historical ALPR data directly and held its use did not constitute a search requiring a warrant, distinguishing periodic observations at fixed cameras from the comprehensive location histories generated by cell phones.

Our approach is not simply to ask what the technology is permitted to collect. We also ask what our personnel should be permitted to access, for what purpose, for how long, and under what oversight.



SECTION 5

Results

What the program has produced, and what the independent research shows.

EVIDENCE

What the research shows

WHAT THE RESEARCH SUPPORTS

- **Taylor, Koper & Woods (2011), Mesa, AZ, NIJ-funded:** Officers using LPRs found nearly three times as many stolen vehicles and recovered twice as many as standard patrol.
- **Shjarback & Sarkos (2025), Atlantic City, peer-reviewed:** A fixed-ALPR expansion was associated with fewer shootings, motor vehicle thefts, and property crimes.
- **Koper & Lum, NIJ-sponsored:** In a city with nearly 100 fixed cameras, LPRs contributed to resolving roughly one in five incidents where investigators used them, across nearly 4,000 cases from auto theft to homicide.

The research consistently supports ALPR's investigative value. Evidence on crime reduction is promising and still developing.

Sources: [Shjarback & Sarkos, Justice Evaluation Journal \(2025\)](#) | [Taylor, Koper & Woods, NIJ \(2011\)](#) | [Koper & Lum, Police Quarterly \(2019\)](#) | [Koper & Lum, Police Chief Magazine](#)



RESULTS

What ALPR has meant for Scottsdale

Families Reunited

5 vulnerable people located with help from ALPR this year alone

A man with dementia

Plate reads and traffic cameras helped an officer reach him safely. He was reunited with his family.

A person in crisis

A flagged plate was read hours after a crisis hotline call. Officers made a safe stop and got the person help.

Work that has a direct impact on Scottsdale residents and visitors.

Violent Crimes Solved

90+ rounds fired into a home with people inside. Plate reads led to multiple arrests.

Suspect of hate crime caught

Plate reads placed the suspect's vehicle at the scene, and detectives made the arrest.

Trafficking victims rescued

An alert on a stolen car led to a traffic stop. Two women forced into sex work were rescued, and a third was found at a hotel.

Vehicles Recovered

27 stolen-vehicle recoveries with at least one arrest in 2026

Stolen plates, stolen car

An analyst spotted one car cycling through stolen plates. The car went back to its owner; the driver was arrested.

A repeat offender identified

Plate reads identified a multi-state offender accused of using a stolen credit card at a home-improvement store. He was arrested on felony charges.



RESULTS

Outcomes Since Inception of Program

200+

Felony arrests

supported by ALPR information

\$2.7M+

Recovered value

in stolen vehicles returned to owners

Multiple missing persons have been located and trafficking victims identified. Set against the financial and human cost of violent crime, medical care, long-term impact on victims, investigation, and prosecution, the investment is modest. ALPR also allows enforcement to be directed at specific vehicles connected to documented concerns, rather than relying on generalized enforcement.

The use of ALPR reduces contacts of uninvolved citizens.



AUGUST 23, 2026

A 79-year-old man with dementia drives away from home while his wife is busy in the house. He has no phone.

- Police are called to his home. Officers don't know where he went, or when.
- ALPR hit identified where his car was last seen, and what time.
- Officers found him at a nearby business, in the middle of a summer day.
- He was safely reunited with his wife.

A missing husband and neighbor. Summer heat. Found safe.

Without plate reads, officers had no starting point and no timeline.

2026-08-23 16:00:06 -0700
AXON BODY 4 D01AL846B



4:00 PM Wife reports him missing. No phone, no direction of travel.

SECTION 6

Governance and Suggestions Moving Forward

Audits confirmed no misuse. We continue to strengthen the program.

Where state law and national standards are heading

2027 SESSION

Scottsdale's position

- Numerous ALPR bills are anticipated.
- Scottsdale supports standardized statewide guidelines for ALPR use, including criminal penalties for misuse.
- The Department will work through the AACOP Legislative Committee on statewide standards.

NATIONAL STANDARDS

Aligned with IACP

In August 2026, the International Association of Chiefs of Police endorsed lawful, ethical, transparent, and accountable ALPR use. Its core safeguards are the same standards Scottsdale measures itself against: documented purpose, restricted and attributed access, written policy, alerts treated as leads, tamper-resistant audit records, prompt investigation of misuse, and limits on sharing.

Source: [IACP Statement on the Responsible Use of Automated License Plate Recognition Technology \(August 2026\)](#)



APRIL 2001

The last lead was a vehicle

April 9, 10:43 p.m.

An ATM camera at 74th Street and McDowell captures Robert Fisher. His wife's Toyota 4Runner is parked behind him.

April 10

The Fisher home explodes. Mary Fisher and the couple's two children are found dead. Robert Fisher and their 4Runner is gone.

April 20

A camper's tip leads investigators to the 4Runner, hidden on a forest road near Young, more than 200 miles away. Robert Fisher is not located and was placed on the FBI's Top 10 Most Wanted List.

Today

Robert Fisher remains wanted.

Ten days passed before anyone knew where that vehicle went. ALPR could have given investigators a direction of travel within hours, not days.



ATM surveillance, April 9, 2001. The 4Runner is visible behind Fisher.



ALPR IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PUBLIC SAFETY TOOLS WE HAVE

Losing ALPR is a leap back in time.

ALPR is not a math equation. One camera does not equal a set number of officers. It works 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and gives investigators avenues that did not exist 20 years ago.

Slower.

Leads that take minutes today would take days, months, years, or never.

Costlier.

More officer hours per case, drawn from patrol time or overtime.

Fewer solved.

Including the 27 stolen-vehicle recoveries with arrests that ALPR drove in 2026.



Our mission to ensure a safe Scottsdale doesn't change.
Our ability to carry it out does.

SCOTTSDALE

SPECIAL EVENT SEASON

What is at stake when the world comes to Scottsdale

Nearly 12 million

visitors a year

- Signature events draw national and international crowds: the WM Phoenix Open, Barrett-Jackson, Old Town, and the Arabian Horse Show.
- Several are federally risk-rated special events (SEAR). Crowds and worldwide attention make them potential terror targets.
- ALPR alerts officers when a vehicle tied to a terrorist watch-list record enters the city, so they can verify and respond before it reaches a crowd.



Scottsdale is a world-renowned destination for events, entertainment, and tourism built on a reputation for safety and exceptional service. PGA Rated WM Phoenix Open as the safest and best run Golf Event on the Tour.



CLOSING

Public safety and privacy are not competing values.

ALPR technology has helped Scottsdale locate dangerous offenders, find vulnerable missing people, recover stolen property, support human-trafficking investigations, and intervene before further harm occurred. Its contribution has been lifesaving.

Powerful technology also requires powerful safeguards. We limit use to legitimate law enforcement purposes, restrict and attribute access, require training and documentation, prohibit personal use, protect free-speech activity, verify alerts before action, and audit the system quarterly.

Our audits have found no misuse. We continue to strengthen our program through independent audit, a technology ordinance with real penalties, evaluation of alternative vendors, and public transparency about how these tools are used.

Scottsdale's program should be evaluated on Scottsdale's policies, safeguards, audit results, and how the program is run.

NEXT STEPS

Considerations For Moving Forward

1 Independent City Auditor review

Requested. Covers user access, policy compliance, hot lists, sharing, retention, vendor access, and security.

2 Technology ordinance and criminal penalties

For Council consideration, with criminal penalties for intentional misuse where Arizona law allows.

3 Immediately evaluate alternative vendors

Including data-control models: whether other solutions can match today's capability with more control over its data.

4 Public technology transparency website

The technologies we use, the rules governing them, and audit summaries when available.

5 Consideration of reduction of users

Review whether total system access can be reduced.

6 Annual attestations and policy review by users

Every user reviews and signs off on the ALPR policy each year.

7 Review of current retention schedule

Plate reads: 185 days. We will review whether a shorter period works without losing effectiveness.

8 Consider an independent study of the program

An outside evaluation, such as a university partner, of how ALPR affects public safety outcomes.



Discussion

Joe LeDuc, Chief of Police



Item 16

Lane, Benjamin

From: Jayne Brenna <jaynebrenna1@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2026 5:40 AM
To: City Council
Subject: Flock cameras

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

The fear of the data being misused should be the primary goal because that's the root of the fear of the cameras. Any data system needs security. Some need super security measures. Measures like multiple layers of tracking and limitation of the access and use of the data.

I don't know what currently exists but it's obviously sloppy in some cases (not ours of course) where it was misused by law enforcement personnel.

That too is the root of the fear. When innocent people get hurt instead of only criminals something is terribly wrong with the system.

Create a bullet-proof access and use security system and monitor the use like a hawk! Plus when something goes wrong, be open and honest about what happened and how you plan to fix it. This is also about regaining trust with the police again too. Not that ours has done anything wrong...right Joe? 🐶

Love you guys! Tough topic to solve!

Lane, Benjamin

From: emese.a <emese.a@protonmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2026 9:11 AM
To: City Council
Subject: Flock License Plate Readers - unFlock Scottsdale

| External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

I recently learned about Scottsdale's Flock AI license plate reader program and I am writing to express opposition to it. I do not want the City surveilling me to this extent.

Lane, Benjamin

From: Marilyn Craik <mcraik311@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, September 28, 2026 9:14 PM
To: City Council
Subject: Flock License Plate Readers - unFlock Scottsdale

Importance: High

⚠ External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

I recently learned about Scottsdale's Flock AI license plate reader program and I am writing to express opposition to it. I do not want the City surveilling me to this extent.

Scottsdale currently has 85 flock cameras and every single one of them is an invasion of a person's rights and privacy.

TAKE THEM OUT!!

Marilyn Craik
Scottsdale, AZ

Lane, Benjamin

From: Scott Manos <scottfromscottsdaleaz@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2026 10:28 AM
To: City Council
Subject: 2319986

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

Thank you for taking my opinion into consideration Chief LeDuc and City Council.

The only positive memory I have of that night was being show an image of my attackers truck.

My justice would be non existent without that camera.

With what happened to me, I'll never wanna hear my attackers are sorry.

Nothing would mean more to me than to hear my words and experience changed someone's opinion.

Within a hour the exact truck was identified and I hope you know how effective the law enforcement response has been and how appreciative I em for getting me justice as a victim. I couldn't have asked for more.

Thank you

Lane, Benjamin

From: drvms <drvms@pm.me>
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2026 9:22 AM
To: City Council
Subject: We the People Flock Notice for Scottsdale City Council
Attachments: Flock Scottsdale.odt

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

To all - please see the attached Notice.

Thank you.

Gary Coulombe

To: Mayor Borowsky

To: Vice-Mayor McAllen

To: Member Dubauskas

To: Member Kwasman

To: Member Littlefield

To: Member Graham. Member Whitehead

We the People vs Flock Notice

Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal and Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent

I Gary Coulombe, one of the People (as seen in the Arizona Constitution Article 2, Section 2), *Sui Juris*, do present you with this Notice that you may provide immediate due care; And

Please take notice that We the People have suffered by way of use of contracts that allowed the Government to coerce public officials, as well as private businesses, to interfere with rights of the People. Examples of this are Facebook and X (formerly Twitter) attacks on the rights of the People to assemble and discuss the wrongdoings of Government, as well as the ability to control their private health and elections. In the fundamental law and constitutions, We the People, have the unalienable right to privacy (see evidence below), and our servants have no granted authority to use private business services in order to bypass the use of warrants created by a judicial officer:

Arizona Constitution Article 2 Section 8

No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.

Please take notice that there are separate types of privacy, one is in the home and another is the ability to carry out affairs in privacy! These include assembly with others without Government interference or prying as seen in NAACP v Alabama (see evidence below)

Guaranteed Right to Assembly and Association

"National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1957/91. Accessed 13 Jun. 2026

In an opinion authored by Justice John M. Harlan II, a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Harlan concluded that the state's obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the

state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Please take notice that We the People have a right to assemble to oversee and scrutinize governmental wrongdoings and behavior, and to consult for our common good, which may be put in jeopardy by Government officials and businesses who have access to the private data revealing the location of where people, their phones, and cars are at any given time. The mere knowledge of where and when people meet may allow for members of the body politic to be harassed and retaliated against; And

Rights to Preservation "John Locke Two Treatises of Government" Book 2 Section 6

Excerpt:

"Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully,[sic] so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another."

Please take notice that the People of the American States have the duty to preserve themselves as well as their neighbors in all 50 states and therefore whenever any Government acts in a way that is simply a potential danger of American State interest, the People have a guaranteed right to reform, alter or abolish it. The Flock system is a danger to the People's security, ability to assemble, requiring data storage systems that put a drain on water and consumable resources, as well as the People's right to privacy, which is not relinquished by the mere act of going outside their homes; And

Please take notice that any actions by which an entity would agree to submit information to the Government that the People don't allow the Government to pursue without warrant based on true harm, based on Affirmation or Oath, is simply the Government doing an action by another which it can't do itself (see evidence below); And

Maxim: What I cannot do by myself, I cannot by another [i.e., an agent.] 4 Coke, 24;b 11
Coke, 87a; Jenk. Cent. 237

Please take final notice that it is therefore my wish, order and demand that all actors partaking in the Flock program show where the People granted authority for Government and a private entity to come together in order to exchange information which could be dangerous to We the People and a violation of our right to privacy. By failing to respond with constitutional authority or grants from the People, by affidavit and sworn under the penalty of perjury within five (5) days, you agree that you are acting without right, with full knowledge, intent and malice and that you

recognize that all written herein as truth. This notice is sent to you in the peace and love of Christ that you may immediately cease and desist from this practice.

Gary Coulombe

Autograph

September 30, 2026

Date

Lane, Benjamin

From: Marko Pecic <mpecic@me.com>
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2026 3:15 PM
To: City Council
Subject: Flock License Plate Readers - unFlock Scottsdale

 **External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!**

Dear Members of the City Council,

I am writing to urge the City Council to end Scottsdale's Flock license plate reader program. I find the scale of this surveillance deeply troubling. Automated cameras that log the movements of every vehicle, without a warrant and without any suspicion of wrongdoing, are an invasion of privacy I am not willing to accept from my local government. As a resident and taxpayer, I do not consent to having my daily travel recorded and stored in a database, and I ask that the City discontinue the program and delete the data it has collected.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,

Marko Pecic

Resident of 85255

Lane, Benjamin

From: notifications@cognitoforms.com on behalf of City of Scottsdale
<notifications@cognitoforms.com>
Sent: Saturday, October 3, 2026 11:01 AM
To: Lane, Benjamin
Subject: City Council Public Written Comment Form - Michael McCallister

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

City of Scottsdale

Web Scottsdale City Council Meeting Written Comment Form

A rectangular button with a textured, pixelated background. The text "Open Form" is centered in a bold, sans-serif font.

Entry Details

Agenda Item

MEETING DATE 10/6/2026

WHICH AGENDA ITEM WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON? 16. Flock Camera Usage

Name

FULL NAME Michael McCallister

Contact Information

PHONE (602) 684-3484

EMAIL mikemc@terabytemedia.com

ADDRESS 13124 E Gold Dust Ave

CITY Scottsdale

Comment

COMMENT

Dear Mayor Borowsky and Members of the City Council,

I am a lifelong resident of Scottsdale, writing on Item 16, Flock Camera Usage.

I have read the Police Department's presentation, and I do not doubt the cases it describes. My concern is not whether these cameras can be useful. The matter before you is a question of trust.

The presentation sets out the Department's own standard: "policy and accountability before implementation." Residents were not given that. The presentation confirms the Flock contract was administratively approved through City Purchasing in 2023, with no council vote and no public discussion. Since then, 85 cameras have recorded residents' vehicles, with plate data kept for 185 days.

Nearly every safeguard now offered arrived or is proposed only after three and a half years of operation and months of resident pressure: the 2026 contract amendment barring Flock from selling our data, the independent audit, a technology ordinance with penalties, a transparency website, and a review of the retention period. Residents had to file public records requests to learn basic facts about the program. In November 2025 the Department confirmed it participated in Flock's National Lookup; the presentation now says only Arizona agencies can access Scottsdale's data. If that changed, residents deserve to know when and why.

The Department asks that the program be judged on Scottsdale's own policies and audits. But those audits are internal, and the independent audit has only been requested. Residents are being asked to trust a system we were never asked to approve.

It is not enough for the police to make their case now, after the cameras have been deployed and in use. The only action that can restore trust is to take the cameras offline, let the Department make its case to the public, and let the people of Scottsdale vote on it. If the benefits truly outweigh the privacy costs, as the Department believes, residents will vote to reinstate them, and the program will have a legitimacy it does not have today.

I respectfully ask the Council to direct staff to suspend use of the Flock cameras and to place any continued use before Scottsdale voters.

Respectfully,

Michael McCallister
13124 E Gold Dust Ave

Lane, Benjamin

From: notifications@cognitoforms.com on behalf of City of Scottsdale
<notifications@cognitoforms.com>
Sent: Sunday, October 4, 2026 1:22 PM
To: Lane, Benjamin
Subject: City Council Public Written Comment Form - Umberto Santoni

| **External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!**

City of Scottsdale

Web Scottsdale City Council Meeting Written Comment Form

Open Form

Entry Details

Agenda Item

MEETING DATE	10/6/2026
WHICH AGENDA ITEM WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON?	16. Flock Camera Usage

Name

FULL NAME	Umberto Santoni
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Contact Information

EMAIL	votive.favors8a@icloud.com
CITY	Scottsdale

Comment

COMMENT

Dear Scottsdale City Council members:

The scale of vehicle surveillance that Scottsdale is engaging in with Flock cameras is deeply concerning. This system isn't just monitoring and logging the movements of vehicles but by implication it is tracking the movements of people within them, without consent, a court order, or suspicion of wrongdoing.

The key issue now is not how best the City of Scottsdale can do this but whether it should at all.

Frankly, this is a conversation the city should have had with residents in depth, well in advance of deploying such a program, particularly given its substantial scale and impact on the privacy expectations of residents.

As a Scottsdale resident and taxpayer, I did not ask you to record all my driving movements and I do not consent to it. I find this to be an unacceptable invasion of my privacy.

I urge you to terminate this program, delete all the data that has been collected, and promptly remove the cameras from Scottsdale.

Respectfully,
Umberto Santoni

Lane, Benjamin

From: CityClerk
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2026 7:43 AM
To: Olmo, Johnny; Lane, Benjamin; Ginsburg, Debbie; Benitez, Bambi; Beck, Shannon
Subject: FW: Flock cameras

From: Holly Goldstein <hrglucky7@icloud.com>
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2026 2:41:47 PM (UTC+00:00) Monrovia, Reykjavik
To: CityClerk
Subject: Flock cameras

⚠ External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

I DO NOT support the use of Flock cameras, or Axon cameras. I realize they have some benefits in tracking crime. However, I do not feel that the government, federal or local, should be using cameras to track the every move of law abiding citizens. Full stop. The potential for abuse outweighs the benefits.

Best,
Holly Goldstein
31802 N. Granite Reef Rd.
Scottsdale 85266

Lane, Benjamin

From: notifications@cognitoforms.com on behalf of City of Scottsdale
<notifications@cognitoforms.com>
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2026 7:47 AM
To: Lane, Benjamin
Subject: City Council Public Written Comment Form - Kevin Watts
Attachments: AZ FOP SCOTTSDALE ALPR Letter - VP Watts.pdf

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

City of Scottsdale

Web Scottsdale City Council Meeting Written Comment Form

Open Form

Entry Details

Agenda Item

MEETING DATE	10/6/2026
WHICH AGENDA ITEM WOULD YOU LIKE TO COMMENT ON?	16. Flock Camera Usage

Name

FULL NAME	Kevin Watts
NAME OF GROUP OR ORGANIZATION	Arizona State Fraternal Order of Police

Contact Information

PHONE	(602) 935-7467
EMAIL	pd631@netscape.net

ADDRESS

PO BOX 11029

CITY

Glendale

Comment

COMMENT

My name is Kevin Watts, and I serve as Vice President of the Arizona Fraternal Order of Police, representing over 9,400 members in Arizona. I am writing regarding the Scottsdale Police Department's continued use of automated license plate reader technology.

The ongoing discussion regarding ALPR technology raises legitimate questions about privacy, access to information and the appropriate limits on law enforcement technology. Those questions deserve serious consideration. They should also be considered alongside two equally important questions: What does this technology actually do for public safety, and what safeguards already exist to prevent its misuse?

ALPR is not facial recognition. It does not identify the driver or passengers inside a vehicle. It does not record continuous video. It captures images of vehicles and license plates traveling on public roadways and converts that information into data that can be used in legitimate law enforcement investigations. That distinction matters.

An ALPR camera does not solve a crime. Police officers and detectives solve crimes. We interview witnesses, examine evidence, obtain warrants, review surveillance footage and build cases. ALPR is one investigative tool that can provide something investigators have always needed: a lead. Sometimes that lead can make an extraordinary difference. We have already seen numerous examples across the state.

In Prescott, someone fired at least a dozen rounds toward a veterinary clinic in September. Surveillance footage showed a

white Ford Expedition entering the parking lot shortly before the shooting. Investigators reviewed ALPR information and identified a matching vehicle entering Prescott before the shooting and leaving afterward. That information helped investigators identify the owner. Police subsequently arrested a suspect who, according to the department, admitted to the shooting. Prescott Police described the technology as critical to an investigation that otherwise might have gone unsolved.

In Peoria, ALPR technology helped police locate an 82-year-old man who failed to arrive for a doctor's appointment. In another case, a 79-year-old man with Alzheimer's disease disappeared in his vehicle. ALPR alerts tracked the vehicle through several communities, allowing Peoria detectives to coordinate with Buckeye Police and safely locate the man after he had traveled more than 150 miles. The same technology helped Peoria investigators following a road-rage shooting in which a woman was shot in the leg. ALPR information helped identify the shooter's vehicle and license plate. Detectives obtained search warrants, arrested a suspect and recovered a firearm and shell casing. Police said the suspect later confessed. Other Arizona departments have reported similar results. Cottonwood Police used license plate reader information following an armed robbery at a gas station when witnesses could not describe the suspect vehicle but could not provide a license plate. The information helped identify the vehicle, and the suspect was arrested within an hour. In another Cottonwood case, an ALPR alert helped officers locate a person wanted in Utah on allegations involving aggravated sexual abuse of a child and 20 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor.

These are not theoretical benefits. They involve shootings, violent offenders, vulnerable missing people, stolen vehicles, sexual offenses and other serious crimes.

Chandler Police reported that between July 2025 and April 2026 its ALPR system contributed to 39 arrests, the recovery of 16 stolen vehicles and the location of nine missing people.

For Scottsdale, there is another important consideration. This community routinely hosts major events that attract hundreds of thousands of residents and visitors, including the WM Phoenix Open and Barrett-Jackson. ALPR provides Scottsdale officers another means of identifying vehicles connected to wanted persons, serious crimes or credible public-safety threats. It also gives investigators a tool for locating vulnerable and endangered missing people when the appropriate police reports and alerts have been entered. None of that means ALPR technology should operate without restrictions. It should not.

The appropriate public-policy discussion is not whether safeguards are necessary. They are. The question is whether Scottsdale has meaningful safeguards governing access and use. Scottsdale Police does.

Under the Department's procedures, ALPR use must have a legitimate law-enforcement or public-safety purpose. Entries into the system generally must be connected to a department report, call for service or investigative case number. Only authorized and trained personnel may use the system, and access is controlled through the Real Time Crime Center.

The Department also prohibits use of the system to track participants in protests or other protected free-speech activities. ALPR alerts are not treated as independent proof that a person has committed a crime. Alerts are verified through ACIC/NCIC before enforcement action is taken. Scottsdale limits sharing to law enforcement agencies operating under comparable standards

governing use and monitoring. These are substantial safeguards.

They matter because any law enforcement technology can be misused. Criminal justice databases, body-worn cameras, investigative records and other tools available to police also can be misused. The appropriate response to that risk is strong policy, training, auditing, accountability and meaningful consequences for violations.

It is also important for the Council to distinguish between concerns about what ALPR technology theoretically could be used to do and evidence about how Scottsdale Police actually uses it.

We are not aware of evidence that Scottsdale officers have used ALPR to track political activity, monitor protesters, conduct searches for personal reasons or otherwise intentionally misuse the system. If evidence of improper use exists, it should be investigated and addressed. Accountability is fundamental to public trust. But the possibility of misuse is different from documented misuse.

There is also a tendency in discussions about this technology to describe ALPR as though it provides police with a live video record of everyone traveling through a community. That is not an accurate description of the technology Scottsdale officers are using. ALPR captures vehicle and plate information. It is not facial recognition, and it does not create continuous video surveillance.

As representatives of Arizona law enforcement officers, we believe this distinction is important. Police departments increasingly are being asked to respond faster, investigate increasingly complex crimes, and protect growing communities with finite numbers of officers. Technology that allows an investigator to identify a suspect vehicle in minutes, rather than spending hours or days

manually reviewing information, can matter enormously. It can matter even more when the objective is not making an arrest, but finding a missing child, an elderly person with dementia or another endangered person before something happens to them.

The relevant facts for Scottsdale are straightforward: ALPR technology has demonstrated public-safety value in Arizona. It has assisted investigations of serious violent crimes and helped locate vulnerable missing people. Scottsdale has established significant restrictions governing who can use the technology and for what purposes. Searches are tied to legitimate law-enforcement activity, access is restricted, alerts require verification and protected First Amendment activity is expressly outside the permissible uses identified by the Department.

We believe those facts deserve careful consideration as the Council evaluates Scottsdale's ALPR program.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the perspective of the Arizona Fraternal Order of Police and the men and women we represent.

Respectfully,

Kevin Watts VP AZ FOP

Attachments

FILE UPLOAD

AZ FOP SCOTTSDALE ALPR Letter - VP Watts.pdf



Fraternal Order of Police Arizona State Lodge

Paul Sheldon
President

Patrick Scherden
Secretary

October 6, 2026

Mayor Lisa Borowsky and Members of the Scottsdale City Council
City of Scottsdale
3939 N. Drinkwater Boulevard
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251

Re: Automated License Plate Reader Technology

Mayor Borowsky and Members of the City Council:

My name is Kevin Watts, and I serve as Vice President of the Arizona Fraternal Order of Police, representing over 9,400 members in Arizona. I am writing regarding the Scottsdale Police Department's continued use of automated license plate reader technology.

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They matter because any law enforcement technology can be misused. Criminal justice databases, body-worn cameras, investigative records and other tools available to police also can be misused. The appropriate response to that risk is strong policy, training, auditing, accountability and meaningful consequences for violations.

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
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We believe those facts deserve careful consideration as the Council evaluates Scottsdale's ALPR program.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the perspective of the Arizona Fraternal Order of Police and the men and women we represent.

Respectfully,



Kevin Watts

Vice President

Arizona Fraternal Order of Police



Lane, Benjamin

From: Brady Thurman <bradythurman@gmail.com>
Sent: Monday, October 5, 2026 11:19 AM
To: City Council
Subject: A Request to Remove Flock Cameras in Scottsdale, Arizona

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

Dear Scottsdale City Council,

As a citizen of the United States, a country founded on personal freedoms, high security is not worth compromising our personal liberties. We deserve privacy and the freedom to know we are not being watched 24/7. Flock claims to be using these cameras for security purposes, but the automated system they have put in place can easily also gather routine and habitual data. We do not need our faces, identities, and habits tracked. There have already been numerous reports of abuses of the data these cameras have gathered across the country. American citizens, along with myself, have grown increasingly upset with the abuse of surveillance power since it compromises our rights to privacy and freedom.

Flock cameras should be removed in order to effectively maintain our civil liberties as American citizens.

Regards,

- Brady Thurman

From: Amy Herring <amy.herring@hotmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, October 6, 2026 6:24 AM
To: City Council
Cc: Amy Herring
Subject: FLOCK cameras

External Email: Please use caution if opening links or attachments!

Honorable Mayor and council members as a resident of the city of Scottsdale. I am submitting this comment regarding our city's use of Flock Safety license plate readers.

I want to be clear: I support our law enforcement officers, and I recognize that technology like Flock cameras can be a valuable tool for solving crimes, locating stolen vehicles, and helping find missing persons. The safety of our community is a shared priority, and when used properly, this technology serves a genuine public good.

However, public safety tools are only as effective as the public trust backing them. Without strict guardrails, proactive oversight, and enforceable consequences, these surveillance systems risk becoming tools for personal abuse with women disproportionately bearing the burden of that misuse.

National investigative reporting has documented scores of instances where officers face criminal charges or internal discipline for using automated license plate readers to stalk, track, and spy on women without their knowledge or consent. Across the country, officers have misused Flock databases hundreds and in some cases thousands of times to monitor ex-wives, former girlfriends, romantic interests, and women they met in public. When automated tracking systems are used without strict oversight, they can easily turn into digital tools for domestic harassment and stalking.

We do not have to look far in Arizona to see how misuse threatens public safety and accountability:

- **Apache Junction conducted an internal investigation into an officer using license plate reader data for personal tracking.**
- **Chandler terminated its Flock contract after an audit flagged potential internal data misuse.**
- **Tempe shut down its Flock system over community privacy concerns and misuse risks.**

Because Arizona state law does not currently establish specific criminal penalties for the misuse of database data like Flock, municipal action is necessary to protect our community members, especially women and vulnerable residents from unchecked surveillance. Queen Creek recently set a local precedent by amending its town code to establish a Class 1 misdemeanor for any knowing misuse of Flock data, including personal tracking, harassment, or unauthorized sharing.

If Scottsdale is to continue to utilize Flock safety cameras, I ask the City Council to pass a formal, binding ordinance containing:

- 1. Strict Legal Penalties for Misuse: Establish explicit local prohibitions making intentional personal use, stalking, or unauthorized querying of ALPR data an enforceable local violation subject to immediate termination and criminal prosecution.**
- 2. Proactive & Independent Audits: Mandate continuous logging and regular, publicly accessible audits of all system queries to ensure searches are tied to legitimate law enforcement investigations rather than personal curiosity or harassment.**
- 3. Data Sharing Safeguards: Explicitly restrict automated data sharing with outside agencies or non-law-enforcement third parties without an active, verified criminal investigation.**

Technology should protect our community, not create new vectors for personal harm or harassment. By establishing clear

boundaries, strict penalties, and real accountability, Scottsdale can protect public safety while safeguarding privacy and personal safety for all residents.

Thank you for your time and dedication to our community and keeping Scottsdale a safe place for everyone in our community.

Amy Herring